Abstract: A reexamination of the burial and heroization of the Spartan general Brasidas at Amphipolis in 422 in terms of political contestation between democrats and oligarchs invites broader theorizing about the political role of public commemoration in the Classical period. Forms of commemoration, including hero-cult, statues, and public burials, were often closely associated with political regimes, which might hope to promote their legitimacy and stability through the regular gathering of massed groups of citizens around commemorative monuments. Tyrannicide-and founder-cults, as well as honorary statues, also often instructed citizens of democracies in how to resist takeover by anti-democratic factions. Memorials thus had a dynamic and practical function in addition to an ideological one. Oligarchies by contrast might manipulate existing forms of commemoration to deliver a political threat and strengthen their rule.
Recent yeaRS have witneSSed a growing focus on Classical Greek politics outside democratic Athens. In inventories, edited volumes, and monographs, historians have undertaken the important tasks of cataloging known regimes, comparing cases, and noting similarities across constitutional type.
1 In a distinct but related development, scholars have engaged in historical explanation of the mechanisms whereby ancient Greek regimes consolidated and maintained their power over time. Scholarship in this vein, much of it influenced by approaches in the contemporary 3 Thuc. 5.11.1, discussed at length below. All dates are bce unless otherwise noted.
social sciences, identifies specific institutions utilized by states and seeks to understand their precise effects in a theoretically explicit manner. 2 The present study is an exercise on both fronts. It re-examines a well-known episode of the Peloponnesian War, the burial and heroization of the Spartan general Brasidas at Amphipolis in 422 bce, 3 in order to make a claim about Amphipolitan constitutional history. At the same time, having argued that Brasidas' burial marks a shift from democratic to oligarchic rule at Amphipolis, it lays out in precise terms how the act might have functioned to stabilize the new oligarchic regime.
Previous treatments of Amphipolitan politics have tended to argue either for a change to oligarchy based on probability (the introduction of Spartan governors elsewhere was frequently accompanied by a constitutional shift), or against a change based on the silence of our sources. I introduce new reasons for favoring the view that an oligarchy arose in Amphipolis after 422, this time based on the heroization of Brasidas itself. Public burial, heroization, and other forms of commemoration became politically contested acts over the fifth and fourth centuries, with different factions variously championing or opposing commemoration of individuals or groups for political reasons. The circumstances of Brasidas' burial, when viewed alongside previously unnoticed parallels from similar episodes of Classical history, strongly suggest that the construction of a temenos to him "just in front of what is now the agora" (Thucydides), as well as the introduction of yearly contests and sacrifices in his honor, were the actions of a newly ascendant oligarchic government. I thus advance the debate on the political history of Amphipolis by drawing upon its religious history, two strands of scholarly discourse that have rarely been in communication.
In the second part of the article, I engage in some broader theorizing-with recourse to contemporary social science literature-to explain the specific visual and informational dynamics at work in the oligarchs' manipulation of Brasidas' hero cult. Put briefly, the very open and public nature of the cult was used to publicize the power of the new regime and to signal to the demos that collective resistance was futile. An understudied 7 For this episode as indicative of a democratic constitution at Amphipolis, see Graham 1999, 206; Isaac 1986, 38-39; Hornblower ad loc.; IACP no. 553, p. 820 (FlenstedJensen) ; Robinson 2011, 145. 8 Thuc. 4.132.3 . For constitutional change following the installation of a Spartan governor, cf. the example of Mende in 423: Thuc. 1.30.7. 9 Gomme in HCT 3, 623-24; Isaac 1986, 43; Robinson 2011, 145-46; IACP no. 553, p. 820; Brock 2009, 152-53. 10 Pol. 5.1306a 2-4; cf. 1303b3. For this interpretation, see Robinson 2011, 146. ple\ thos had been won over by Brasidas' terms. The Athenians left, the Amphipolitans retained their democracy, and Thucydides arrived too late.
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In the event, Brasidas did not keep his promise to the Amphipolitans about their constitutional autonomy. In 423 he established a young Spartan, Clearidas the son of Cleonymus, as archo\ n of Amphipolis. 8 Scholars are divided over whether this move entailed a change from democracy to oligarchy. Gomme in his historical commentary on Thucydides assumes a new oligarchy, as does Isaac in his study of the Greeks in Thrace. Robinson, who has thoroughly investigated the evidence for every possible case of Classical-era democracy, leans toward oligarchy as well. Flensted-Jensen in the Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis is agnostic, however, and Brock believes that if there had been a change of constitution at Amphipolis, Thucydides would have mentioned it. 9 There is little help outside of this episode in Thucydides in deciding the issue. We know that after the Peace of Nicias Clearidas claimed that the Amphipolitans were unwilling to re-submit to the Athenian empire as the peace treaty demanded. This implacable stance could be explained as the result of a more rabidly anti-Athenian group now being in power, namely, oligarchs (Thuc. 5.21.2; cf. 35.3, 46.2) . Additionally, Plutarch tells us that a group of Amphipolitan citizens visited Sparta after Brasidas' death, apparently on official business, and praised him to his mother. The behavior looks characteristic of oligarchic Laconophiles rather than democrats (Lyc. 25.5; cf. Mor. 190b, 240c; Ael. VH 2.19) . Finally, Aristotle tells us that anti-oligarchic stasis once erupted in Amphipolis, and scholars again have reasonably inferred that this oligarchy was the one that had been established in the time of Brasidas.
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In any case, we lack explicit confirmation from any source that Amphipolis became an oligarchy during the Peloponnesian War. The burial of Brasidas and his subsequent heroization, however, might further suggest a constitutional change. Brasidas died in the Battle of Amphipolis in 422, fighting with the Amphipolitans and other Peloponnesian allies against Athenian forces led by Cleon (Thuc. 5.6-10). Following the battle, which the Spartan side won, Brasidas was buried at Amphipolis in a com- 11 Other mentions of Brasidas' heroization and cult include Arist. NE 5.1134b23, Suda s.v. Βρασίδας, and Steph. Byz. s.v. Ἁγνώνεια, but they add little to what we already know from Thucydides.
12 Thuc. 5.11.1. All translations of Greek are mine unless otherwise noted. Scholars have wondered whether the σφίσι in σφίσι ξυμφόρως οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἡδέως refers to the Amphipolitans or to Hagnon himself; I assume that the adverbs refer to the same subject and that, since ξυμφόρως is clearly to do with the Amphipolitans' political situation, it is the Amphipolitans.
13 See, e.g., Leschhorn 1984, 153-56; Malkin 1987, 228-32; Hoffmann 2000; Ekroth 2002, 184-85; Currie 2005, 164-65; Hornblower ad loc; Mari 2012; Fröhlich 2013, 238-39. 14 For burial at public expense and ongoing (perhaps heroic) honors, cf. the cases of Tellus the Athenian (Hdt. 1.30.3-5), Archias the Spartan at Samos (Hdt. 3.55.2), and (more speculatively) Strepsiades, the uncle of the laudandus of Pindar's seventh Isthmian (I. 7.23-36); cf. Currie 2005, 104-5, 205-10 . See further the cases of Euphron of Sicyon (Xen. Hell. 7.3.12) and Heropythus of Ephesus (Ar. Anab. 1.17.11), both discussed below, for burial plex sequence of events, our best source for which remains Thucydides.
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It is worth quoting the entire passage in full: 12 τὸν Βρασίδαν οἱ ξύμμαχοι πάντες ξὺν ὅπλοις ἐπισπόμενοι δημοσίᾳ ἔθαψαν ἐν τῇ πόλει πρὸ τῆς νῦν ἀγορᾶς οὔσης· καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οἱ Ἀμφιπολῖται, περιείρξαντες αὐτοῦ τὸ μνημεῖον, ὡς ἥρωί τε ἐντέμνουσι καὶ τιμὰς δεδώκασιν ἀγῶνας καὶ ἐτησίους θυσίας, καὶ τὴν ἀποικίαν ὡς οἰκιστῇ προσέθεσαν, καταβαλόντες τὰ Ἁγνώνεια οἰκοδομήματα καὶ ἀφανίσαντες εἴ τι μνημόσυνόν που ἔμελλεν αὐτοῦ τῆς οἰκίσεως περιέσεσθαι, νομίσαντες τὸν μὲν Βρασίδαν σωτῆρά τε σφῶν γεγενῆσθαι καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἅμα τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ξυμμαχίαν φόβῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων θεραπεύοντες, τὸν δὲ Ἅγνωνα κατὰ τὸ πολέμιον τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως σφίσι ξυμφόρως οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἡδέως τὰς τιμὰς ἔχειν.
All the allies followed in arms and buried Brasidas at public expense in the city, just in front of what is now the agora. Since that time the Amphipolitans, who fenced in a memorial for him, sacrifice to him as a hero and have instituted contests and yearly sacrifices as honors for him, and they attribute the settlement to him, as founder. They tore down the Hagnonian buildings and erased anything that might continue to serve as a reminder of his [Hagnon's] founding, considering Brasidas to be their savior and, for the moment, cultivating an alliance with the Spartans out of fear of the Athenians; they thought that Hagnon's having honors was no longer convenient or pleasing to themselves as it had been before, due to their enmity towards the Athenians.
This influential passage has given rise to several treatments of hero and founder cult, the majority of which have considered Brasidas' heroization in religious terms. 13 The "public" (δημοσίᾳ) nature of the burial, as well as the willingness of the Amphipolitans to inter Brasidas' body near-if not, strictly speaking, in-the agora, have been considered characteristic of practices of hero cult.
14 The construction of a temenos, the institution figure 11B ). 15 For games and sacrifices, see-in addition to the examples of Timoleon and Aratus listed above-the cult of Theagenes of Thasos (Paus. 6.11.8), and the examples found at Hdt. 1. 168, 5.47, 5.114.1-115.1, 6.38.1, 7.116-117 . (For hero cult in Herodotus, see Harrison 2000, 158-64.) For founder status, see the examples of Aratus, Timoleon, and Euphron of Sicyon.
16 I do not wish to suggest that heroization was not normally a "political" act, or to establish a modern (and false) distinction between politics and religion in the ancient Greek world. The institution of a new hero cult was obviously significant for a Greek polis' sense of community and political identity. I mean political conflict between groups. For the establishment of hero cult as an act of, e.g., political legitimization, see Polyaen. 6.53 (Hagnon at Amphipolis) with Boedeker 1998; McCauley 1999; Welwei 2004 . For the connection between hero cult and the identity of a political community more generally, see Leschhorn 1984 passim; Ekroth 2007, 110-11. 17 Scholars are generally agreed that the Hagnonian buildings were cult structures dedicated to Hagnon's worship as a hero during his lifetime: Malkin 1987, 230-32; Hornblower ad loc.; Currie 2005, 163-66. 18 The interpretation of Dougherty 1993, 25-26 , follows Thucydides on this point. 19 If I am correct about the change in constitution to oligarchy at Amphipolis, there are several ways of interpreting Thucydides' silence. He could have a) simply not known, or b) known but not bothered to reveal the fact. I find the first option unlikely, in particular because Thucydides was well acquainted with the Thracian coast and in fact enjoyed the right of working the mines there (4.105.1). More likely to me is the explanation that he did not think the information important. Thucydides elsewhere mentions constitutional details merely in passing, or else leaves out regime labels but provides enough information for the reader to draw the inference (e.g., at 4.130.7, 5.31.6 To see this, consider the fact that acts of damnatio memoriae such as the Amphipolitans performed on Hagnon's monuments also frequently characterize conflict between political regime-types. 20 The onset of a new regime was often accompanied by a symbolic erasure or appropriation of objects characteristic of the previous order. For example, we possess a third-century bce decree from Ilion in the Troad enumerating rules for killing tyrants and oligarchs. 21 The decree is similar in scope and content to the Oath of Demophantus and the law of Eucrates from Athens, as well as the fourth-century Eretrian law against oligarchy and tyranny edited by Denis Knoepfler. 22 Uniquely, however, the Ilion decree contains in its third section a series of injunctions specifically concerned with erasing names:
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Whoever should become a tyrant or leader of an oligarchy, or sets up a tyranny or helps in setting one up or dissolves the democracy, wherever the names of these people should happen to be, whether among the priestly objects or on a dedication or on a tomb, they must be cut out everywhere. . . . And however many private dedications were set up, the demos is to erase the words of the dedicator and deliberate about the dedication, so that they will not be set up and there will be no memorial left. And where a common dedication of other such people has been inscribed, [the demos] is to erase and make invisible the name on it.
The close correspondence between the passage of Thucydides and the Ilion decree is striking. In addition to the Hagnonian buildings being torn down, anything that was going to serve as a "reminder" (μνημόσυνον) of Hagnon's founding was erased; this must in many instances have included his name, whether on decrees or on dedications. Similarly, the names of tyrants and oligarchs are to be cut out "everywhere" (παντόθε[ν] Of course, in different contexts names might be condemned to oblivion for different reasons and for different audiences. The driving force need not have been constitutional change. Yet the Ilion decree does provoke a series of further questions about the Brasidas episode: Why did the Amphipolitans go to such trouble to erase every last instance of Hagnon's name? Were the Spartans that likely to happen upon a stray mention of Hagnon and become furious? The Ilion example suggests that the Amphipolitans' decision to destroy every trace of Hagnon was meant more for an internal audience than an external one. Not just the Spartans, but all of the Amphipolitans would be well aware after this process of damnatio was finished that Amphipolis was now a very different polis. Thus I consider the systematic erasing of Hagnon from the civic landscape to have been a message for certain groups within the city, in particular those who had been closely aligned with the former, Athenian-led, democratic regime. The process at Amphipolis was similar to the one at Ilion, albeit constitutionally the reverse: instead of a democracy forgetting an oligarchy, this was an oligarchy forgetting the democracy.
The process of erasure found in the Ilion decree therefore provides one piece of comparative evidence that we are looking at constitutional change from democracy to oligarchy in Amphipolis. Another piece comes from the later fifth century, in Samos, and also involves heroic honors (perhaps even deification), in this case for a living man. Here we are undoubtedly seeing the manipulation of public commemoration in the service of consolidating the power of a recently established oligarchic government. The Spartan general Lysander concluded his siege of democratic Samos in 404, during the final years of the Peloponnesian War. He handed the polis over to its "traditional citizens" (archaioi politai), a band of oligarchic exiles. 24 Lysander appointed a "decarchy" of ten men and also left a harmost in control of a garrison, much as Brasidas had sent Clearidas as governor to Amphipolis a few decades earlier. 25 The oligarchs in power showed their gratitude towards Lysander by worshiping him as a god and renaming their traditional festival of Hera the Lysandreia. 26 Lysander's yearly cult festival included poetic competitions and athletic contests; he himself presumably presided, since we know he was 27 Duris FGrHist 76 F26. For more on the Lysandreia see Habicht 1970, 243-44; Cartledge 1982, 264-65; Shipley 1987, 133-34; Currie 2005, 159-63. 28 See Cartledge 1982, 264; Malkin 1987, 231; Currie 2002, 40; Flower 1988, 129-31; Connolly 1998, Appendix. 29 See also the incident reported by Plutarch (Mor. 210d) in which the Thasians offer divine honors to the Spartan king Agesilaus, who refuses them; on this, see Flower 1988. 30 I reserve for a footnote the interesting case of Athens after 307: when Demetrius of Phalerum's oligarchy fell, the Athenians bestowed divine honors on Demetrius Poliorcetes and his son Antigonus (Philoch. FGrHist 328 FF165, 166; Demochares FGrHist 75 F1; Duris FGrHist 76 F13; Plut. Demetr. 10.3-4). The chief instigator of these changes was Stratocles of Diomeia (for whom see Luraghi 2014) . For his opposition to Stratocles the democratic politician Demochares of Leuconoe was exiled (Plut. Demetr. 24.5). Demochares' son later claimed that the action was made by "those who destroyed the democracy," and the decree for Callias of Sphettus likewise labels the period an oligarchy ([Plut.] X Orat. 851e; SEG 28.60, ll. 79-83). We must be careful about taking such emotionally charged labels at face value, but some contemporaries definitely viewed the manipulation of cult as a sign of constitutional change. The comic poet Philippides attacked Stratocles with the verse, "He bestowed the honors of the gods upon men; these things overthrow the democracy (kataluei ton de\ mon), not comedy" (Plut. Demetr. 12.4 = fr. 25 K-A). See further Kuhn 2006. 31 For strategic uses of hero cult during the Archaic period, cf. Cleisthenes of Sicyon's transfer of cult honors from Adrastus of Argos to Melanippus of Thebes (Hdt. 5.67.1-5 with Forsdyke 2013, ch. 3, esp. 97-99) and the Samians' public burial and honoring of Archias of Sparta, who died trying to liberate their polis from the tyrant Polycrates (Hdt. 3.55.2, Plut. Mor. 860c with Cartledge 1982, 250-51) . There is also the example of tyrannical dynasties like the Deinomenids: see Mitchell 2013, ch. 2; Morgan 2015, 84-85. addressed personally in a paean. 27 Thus we have here a secure instance of an oligarchic regime at the end of the fifth century altering its existing cult activities or instituting new rites in a way that was clearly symbolic of the change of constitution that had occurred. Discussions of heroization and deification often mention these two acts, for Brasidas and for Lysander, in the same breath, but none to my knowledge has suggested that the case of Lysander might shed light on the constitutional implications of the Brasidas example.
28 This argumentative move makes good sense, however: in both cases the person of veneration was from Sparta, a city-state frequently admired by oligarchs during this period. The Amphipolitans' choice would thus presage later actions by oligarchs.
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The Samians' worship of Lysander represents a clear case of a new oligarchic regime announcing its power through a novel set of cult institutions. 30 Other sources, however, suggest in a more indirect way that in the fifth and fourth centuries hero cult-never a politically neutral phenomenon to begin with-as well as other forms of public commemoration were becoming even more contested and manipulated along factional lines. 31 Perhaps the most famous example outside of Lysander 32 Xen. Hell. 7.1.44; cf. Diod. Sic. 15.70.3. On Euphron's political career, see Roy 1971, 578-81; Griffin 1982, 70-74; Lewis 2004. 33 Xen. Hell. 7.1.45: ὁ δ᾽ εὐθὺς ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ παρόντων τῶν Ἀργείων καὶ τῶν Ἀρκάδων συνεκάλει τὸν δῆμον, ὡς τῆς πολιτείας ἐσομένης ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ ὁμοίοις. (The detail about the agora will become important shortly.) For Sicyon's oligarchic past, see Thuc. 5.81 with IACP no. 228, pp. 469-70 (Legon).
34 Xen. Hell. 7.3.12: οἱ μέντοι πολῖται αὐτοῦ ὡς ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν κομισάμενοι ἔθαψάν τε ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ καὶ ὡς ἀρχηγέτην τῆς πόλεως σέβονται. οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἱ πλεῖστοι ὁρίζονται τοὺς εὐεργέτας ἑαυτῶν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι. Note that the present tense of the verb σέβονται indicates that the Sicyonians' honoring of Euphron was ongoing. On Euphron's assassination (Xen. Hell. 7.3.4-11), with his murderers styling themselves tyrannicides, see Riess 2006, 72. On his burial and treatment as founder, see Leschhorn 1984, 175-85; Malkin 1987, 232-33; Lewis 2004, 71-72; Fröhlich 2013, 239-40; Gray 2015, 266, 284-85. 35 This would not be the first instance of political manipulation of hero cult in Sicyon; see further the example of the tyrant Cleisthenes, cited above, n. 33. The Sicyonians later engaged in a second round of intramural burial and hero cult, this time for the commander Aratus in the late third century (Plut. Arat. 53, Paus. 2.8.1, 2.9.4).
is Euphron of Sicyon, who in 366 capitalized on the rising democratic power of the Argives and the Arcadian League by breaking his polis away from Sparta and establishing a democracy. 32 Sicyon had until that point been an oligarchy, but Euphron "called together the demos in the agora with the message that there was to be a new constitution on fair and equal terms."
33 Euphron later began to amass tyrannical power and was eventually assassinated in Thebes, but, Xenophon tells us bitterly, "his fellow citizens, on the grounds that he was a good man, conveyed him back to the city and buried him in the agora; and they honor him as founder [arche\ gete\ s] of the polis. So, it seems, the majority consider the people who benefit them to be good men." 34 In choosing to bury Euphron in the agora and honor him, the common people of Sicyon were clearly going against the wishes of the few, who preferred Euphron's memory to be consigned to infamy. The Sicyonian demos was casting its praise of Euphron in the teeth of the furious oligarchs.
35 Furthermore, by calling Euphron their founder, or arche\ gete\ s, the people were announcing that with Euphron's initial convocation of the demos in the agora, their city had been founded anew, or perhaps founded legitimately for the first time, as a democracy. We should understand the Amphipolitans' transferal of founder (oikiste\ s) status from Hagnon to Brasidas in similar terms: with Brasidas' "liberation" of the city from Athenian control, along with the passing of political control from the many to the few, Amphipolis had now at last become (for the oligarchs, at least) a true polis.
Finally, to conclude this survey of parallels for the case of Brasidas, we can observe that not only could one political group honor a contro-36 Cf. Fröhlich 2013, 244, who notes that civic cults begun during times of dissension might later be attacked by political enemies.
37 Anab. 1.17.11: τὸν τάφον ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἀνορύξαντας τὸν Ἡροπύθου τοῦ ἐλευθερώσαντος τὴν πόλιν. (In Simonton 2017 passim I mistakenly gave the nominative form of the name as "Heropythes.") For further context, see Bosworth 1980 ad loc. Lewis 2004, 72, comparing Heropythus to Euphron of Sicyon, notes that the oligarchs' decision to dig up the grave "suggests a recognition that honours were paid to Heropythus to commemorate the establishment of a democracy." Heropythus is mentioned at Polyaen. 7.23.2 (there called "Herophytus") as an opponent of Mausolus, so he must have been alive in the mid-fourth century.
38 For Heropythus as hero, see Foucart 1922, 138-39; Malkin 1987, 233; Debord 1999, 242-6; Lewis 2004, 72; Fröhlich 2013, 243-44 Gauthier 1982, 215-21; Ober 2003, 227-28; Teegarden 2014, ch. 5; Gray 2015, 285. 40 Lines 1-10: ἔδοξεν τῆι βουλῆι καὶ τῶι δήμωι· Ζωίλος Χιά|δου εἶπεν· ἐπειδὴ οἱ ἐν τῆι ὀλιγαρχίαι τῆς εἰ|κόνος τῆς Φιλίτου τοῦ ἀποκτείναντος| τὸν τύραννον τοῦ ἀνδριάντος ἐξεῖλον| τὸ ξῖφος, νομίζοντες καθόλου τὴν στάσιν| καθ' αὑτῶν εἶναι· ὅπως ἂν ὁ δῆμος φαίνηται| πολλὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιούμενος καὶ μνημο|νεύων ἀεὶ τῶν εὐεργετῶν καὶ ζώντων| καὶ τετελευτηκότων, ἀγαθῆι τύχηι δεδόχθαι| τῆι βουλῆι καὶ τῶι δήμωι, etc. versial figure to the chagrin of another, but the other side could then abuse their enemies' honorand in order to send a political message. 36 For example, Arrian reports that during a bout of stasis in Ephesus in the late fourth century, oligarchs "dug up the grave of Heropythus, the liberator of the city, from the agora." 37 Although Arrian does not explicitly call Heropythus a "hero" or "founder," his burial in the agora, like Brasidas', suggests that he was now the recipient of cult within the Ephesian democracy. 38 The oligarchs clearly did not share their fellow citizens' approval of Heropythus' actions. One can imagine that this is what the Sicyonian oligarchs would have done to the monument of Euphron in the agora if they had had the opportunity. Yet it is not enough to assume that the Ephesian oligarchs were simply venting their anger on a hated object in the civic landscape. They also likely thought that exhuming Heropythus would send an appropriate signal that a change of regime was under way. Their action, like the Amphipolitans' obliteration of the memory of Hagnon and their honoring of Brasidas, was not simply for the sake of the in-group but for broader citizen consumption as well.
The second and final example of this type comes from Erythrae, from an inscription dated to the early third century. 39 Although the decree was enacted by a democracy, it describes the actions of an oligarchic coup that had just preceded it: 40 41 See Teegarden 2014, 144-46 with n.12, 152, 163 , for the idea that the Erythraeans worshiped Philites as an almost divine figure. 42 The mention of agoranomoi, or wardens of the marketplace, in the decree (ll. 17, 20, 22, 27) makes it certain that the statue of Philites was located in the Erythraean agora.
43 Although the present argument concerns monuments and rituals of public commemoration specifically, it is possible to apply a similar analysis to several other acts of politically motivated desecration involving an array of objects. Consider, for example, the infamous mutilation of the Herms in 415, likely carried out by oligarchs to discourage the launching of the Sicilian expedition (Thuc. 6.27-29, 53, 60-61 with Osborne 1985, 64-67) ; also the Thirty's removal of the laws of Ephialtes and Archestratus from the Areopagus ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 35.2). The Thirty also destroyed several proxeny decrees which were subsequently re-inscribed by the democracy (IG I 3 229; IG II 2 6, 13, 52; Agora xvi. 37; all analyzed by Shear 2011, 176-77, and Mack 2015, 95) . Democrats were just as capable of destruction and manipulation: Philoch. FGrHist 328 F181 (property of the Thirty); Strab. 9.1.20; Diog. Laert. 5.77 with Azoulay 2009, 324-32 (Demetrius of Phalerum's statues). On the destruction of monuments for political purposes more generally, see Bolmarcich 2007, esp. 482-87; Culasso Gastaldi 2003. Resolved by the council and the people. Zoilus the son of Chiades spoke: Since those in the oligarchy removed the sword from the statue of Philites the tyrant-killer, thinking that its position [stasis] was completely against them; in order that the demos clearly show great concern for and always remember its benefactors, both living and dead, with good fortune be it decided by the council and the people [regulations for the upkeep of the statue follow]
Teegarden, in his recent book on anti-tyranny legislation, has produced the most subtle and convincing interpretation of this decree offered thus far. As with previous commentators, Teegarden argues that the situation at Erythrae was one in which a newly installed oligarchy had defaced the memorial of a hero or champion of the demos. 41 Once the oligarchy was overthrown, however, the triumphant democracy restored the statue and ordered its continual maintenance in perpetuity. 42 Teegarden's reconstruction of the oligarchs' reasoning in removing the sword from the statue will be important for my arguments later. For now, we can observe that the incident fits the pattern established thus far perfectly. Although removing a sword is not as extreme as digging up a grave (or, as I am arguing, tearing down the Hagnonian buildings), the underlying principle seems identical: assert your power during a change of regime by very publicly erasing, altering, or defacing the prominent symbols of your enemies. The Erythrae episode is simply the last in a long series of similar incidents revolving around conflict over commemoration.
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At this point, having established the partisan-political nature of the Amphipolitan oligarchs' burial and heroization of Brasidas, I will 44 See further Ober 2008, 194-99 turn to the particular effects, both ideological and practical, that the act was intended to produce. As with the cases of Lysander, Euphron, and Heropythus, such intended effects may seem obvious: honoring a controversial individual and designating him as a (new, true) founder or liberator was a symbolic gesture, emphasizing the ascendance of the new political order and the eclipse of the old. This description, however, does not fully capture the dynamics at work in the situation. Manipulation of public commemoration did not simply reflect a pre-existing change in power, it was itself a constitutive element of that change. To explain the phenomenon, I will divide the oligarchs' actions into two parts, which correspond to different temporal stages: an initial act of rupture, which helps to establish the new oligarchic regime, and an ongoing, reiterative practice of commemoration that serves to consolidate the regime once in power.
To destroy or alter a previous democratic regime's particular monument(s) was to destroy in a sense a source of popular power. The monuments served as political resources not only because of what they ideologically projected, but also because of what they concretely accomplished by their nature as public rituals: large masses of people coming together and sharing in the public space of the polis. All of the examples surveyed from democracies-Sicyon, Ephesus, Erythrae-presuppose that the demos was honoring these figures at massed social gatherings, in these cases in the central agora. These kinds of gatherings not only solidified the rule of the demos by portraying the people as in control of the public spaces of the polis, they also facilitated future collective action by building up networks of familiarity and trust among the population.
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Oligarchs of the Classical period well understood the danger such gatherings posed to their own rule: the fourth-century Rhetoric to Alexander, probably composed by the sophist Anaximenes of Lampsacus, warns oligarchs that "the mob must not be allowed to gather from the countryside into the astu; for from such assemblies the masses come together and overthrow oligarchies." 45 Preventing the demos from congregating in the polis had been a concern of Archaic tyrants as well, 46 and in fact Aristotle likens the oligarchs of his time to tyrants in their tendency to 47 Pol. 5.1311a13-14: καὶ τὸ κακοῦν τὸν ὄχλον καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως ἀπελαύνειν καὶ διοικίζειν ἀμφοτέρων κοινόν. 50 Lines 68-69. Contra Driscoll 2016, 146 with n.93. Driscoll says "there is nothing intrinsically democratic about the entire body of citizens swearing an oath," and I agree that the mere presence of the community is no guarantee of democracy, as should be apparent from the present argument. I would argue, however, that the massed presence of citizens represented a threat to oligarchies that was not true for democracies. If citizens were to gather in oligarchies, the process would have to be tightly controlled.
"mistreat the mob and drive them from the cities and disperse them." 47 The Rhetoric to Alexander passage makes clear that inner-city gatherings, by bringing large numbers of like-minded people together and facilitating large-scale collective action among them, constituted a source of power for the demos, one which oligarchs had to prevent. It follows that when democratic regimes were in power, they could further ensure their stability and longevity by promoting gatherings of this kind.
In fact, we know of certain exceptional, one-time events that were definitely orchestrated for the purpose of future stability. The mass swearing of the Oath of Demophantus at Athens, for example, was meant to make public the Athenians' collective opposition to tyranny and oligarchy. 48 Similarly, the awarding of crowns to the assassins of the oligarch Phrynichus at the Dionysia of 409 utilized a festival setting to promote democratic solidarity (IG I 3 102 [ = ML 85] with Wilson 2009). We know of additional mass oath-taking rituals from poleis outside Athens in the aftermath of attempted oligarchic takeovers. A recently discovered inscription reveals that the people of the northern Greek city of Dikaia, following a bout of stasis, were "all to swear the oath . . . in the three most holy shrines and in the agora." 49 The oath itself has the citizens declare that "I will not alter the patrios politeia," which, given that the decree is enacted by the assembly (ekkle\ sia), was almost certainly a democracy. 50 Similarly, the citizens of the tiny island polis of Telos are "all" (pantas) to swear an oath (presumably in a public ceremony) to the effect that "I 51 IG XII 4. Parker 1996 , 228-29, Shear 2011 will abide by the established constitution and guard over the democracy." As the beginning of the inscription explains, the oaths are to ensure that "living in harmony [the Telians] might conduct their political life in a democracy." 51 Nearly identical is the language used in a reconciliation agreement from Mytilene from the latter half of the fourth century bce: in order that "the citizens dwell in the polis in a democracy for all time on the best possible terms with each other," they are to swear an oath, make a collective prayer to the gods, and "conduct a sacrifice and procession . . . however seems best to the damos."
52 In all of the instances discussed, democratic regimes use the open, central spaces of the polis to promote democratic solidarity and to create common knowledge of the citizenry's commitment to the status quo.
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These events seem straightforwardly designed for political purposes, but we can expand our viewpoint to see that other, less explicitly charged rituals and festivals, many of them concerned with commemoration of individuals, would in practice have had a similar stabilizing effect. We have already seen that the statue of Philites the tyrant-killer at Erythrae was to be maintained at public expense in perpetuity; a closer look at the remainder of the decree reveals that the statue was to be cleaned and crowned specifically at the festival of the new moon (Noumenia) and at "the other festivals" (allai heortai, IK Erythrai 503.14-16). The effect would have been to fuse the celebration of the festivals with pronouncements and gestures in support of the democratic constitution. 54 The Athenians instituted a yearly festival celebrating the day the demos returned from exile in 403; it may have included heroic worship of the dead heroes of Phyle. 55 An Eretrian inscription of the fourth century likewise enjoins "all 56 IG XII.9 192.3-8. Intriguingly, the moment of liberation came during the procession of Dionysus itself (line 4); presumably the festival setting provided the occasion for a transfer of power (or perhaps even a violent uprising on the part of the demos Loraux 2002, 215-28; Gray 2015, 37-41. 60 Lines 29-31, trans. Lupu 2009 . Note that with the mention of sacrifice to the ancestors we are in the realm of hero cult.
61 My argument provides a complement to the work of Chaniotis, who has done much to illuminate the role of the emotions in cultivating communal ties through ritual (e.g., 2010; 2013, 63-68) . 62 It is thus tempting to think that cult activity in Amphipolis taking place in or near the Hagnonian buildings in the years before 422 was closely connected with the city's democratic constitution.
the citizens" (and in fact all of the inhabitants [enoikountes]) to crown themselves with ivy at the Dionysian festival "so that there might be a memorial of this day . . . when the garrison left and the demos was freed and re-established the ancestral laws and the democracy."
56 Presumably the festival would in subsequent years mark the anniversary of the liberation of the city and the restoration of democracy.
57 A similar festival is instituted in a recently published inscription from Labraunda in Caria, dating to the third century bce: a city, most likely Mylasa, heroizes the dynast Olympichus and creates a procession and offering for him on the day when "the demos recovered its freedom and democracy."
58 Finally, a decree of the city of Nakone in Sicily from the third century bce combines a one-time mass citizen ritual with an annual festival. 59 After bringing together the citizens in the assembly, the archons of the polis are to combine the members of two warring factions into new civic brotherhoods for the purpose of reconciliation (lines 14-21). The decree then commands that "all subsequent magistrates shall sacrifice each year on the same day to the ancestors [genetores] and to Concord [Homonoia] and all the citizens shall celebrate among themselves." 60 Since the Nakone decree is enacted by the assembly (halia) as well as the council (boule\ ), it seems safe to assume the constitutional context is democratic.
Overall the evidence suggests that certain commemorative festivals not only marked specific religious occasions but also served more broadly to remind the populace of the power of the governing democracy and of their devotion to it. 61 In fact, the concentration of citizens in the city-center, devoted to a common purpose, was not merely a symbol of "people-power": it was itself an element of democracy in action. 62 No 63 In addition to political and ideological concerns, tearing down a monument, and in particular a hero shrine, also served a religious function: as heroes were viewed as (potentially) benevolent powers who, if duly honored, extended protection to the community, their removal would have been viewed as the denial of that protective force to a faction's enemies. 64 As noted already, the actual grave of Harmodius and Aristogeiton seems to have been in the Kerameikos (Paus. 1.29.15), but the Critius and Nesiotes statue group was in the agora. 65 Lines 631-34: φυλάξομαι / καὶ φορήσω τὸ ξίφος τὸ λοιπὸν ἐν μύρτου κλαδί, / ἀγοράσω τ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἑξῆς Ἀριστογείτονι, / ὧδέ θ᾽ ἑστήξω παρ᾽ αὐτόν.
wonder, then, that the enemies of democracy often felt compelled to eliminate these activities and replace them with others. The successful destruction or alteration of rituals connected with a polis' democratic form of government signaled a change in power. 63 It also laid bare the conspicuous failure of the citizens to come to the rescue of their supposedly cherished rites.
Indeed, the possibility that a democratic citizenry might acquiesce in the face of attacks on the symbols of their political order brings us to an even more subtle set of considerations at work. Commemorative monuments of heroes and benefactors were often not simply impressive portraits of individuals, but constituted concrete instructions, so to speak, on how to resist attempted coups against democracy. Josiah Ober has shown how this was the case with the statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton in the Athenian agora. 64 A scene from Aristophanes' Lysistrata illustrates how citizens in emergency situations might "take their cue" from the example of the tyrannicides. A member of the halfchorus of old men, confronting a takeover of the city by women, says, "I will stand guard, and I will bear my sword in a bough of myrtle, and I will muster in the agora in arms next to Aristogeiton-like this I will stand beside him." 65 As Ober observes, the deictic "this" (ὧδέ) indicates that at this point in the performance the old man struck a pose similar to that of Harmodius in the Critius and Nesiotes statue group, with his right sword arm lifted above his head. "To be a defender of democracy against subversion, then," Ober notes, "is to 'become' Harmodius-and explicitly to become Harmodius as he is depicted in the [statue] group" (2003, 220) . Just as important as the tyrant-killing stance, however, is the location of the act, in the agora, as indicated by the verb ἀγοράσω, "I will muster in the agora." In the event of a coup against the democracy, the good citizen was expected, not simply to strike the Harmodius pose in defense of the politeia wherever he happened to be, but specifically to gather with his fellow citizens in the agora beside the statues. Here the 66 Ober acknowledges this point in subsequent work, in which he labels the tyrannicide statues in the Athenian agora a "rallying point" and a "focal point" (on which term more below): 2008, 198. 67 Recall that the statue was located in the agora, just as the Athenian tyrannicide monument was. members of the demos could most effectively harness the power of their superior numbers. 66 We should view the other monuments surveyed above similarly. The Philites statue, quite obviously, indicated how Erythraean citizens were meant to act during an attempted takeover, for which reason the oligarchs stripped the statue of its sword. Teegarden has written convincingly that this act was intended to "advertis[e] that tyrannicide . . . will fail." The oligarchs attacked a symbol of democratic resistance in order to make clear to the populace that such resistance was now out of the question. And as Teegarden observes, "history 'backed up' the statue's new symbolic significance: the democracy ushered in by Philites did, in fact, fail" (2014, 150) . The members of the demos, when they saw the statue in its new state, would be painfully aware that they had failed to act as the statue had instructed. If the statue had the same function as a "rallying point" as the Athenian tyrannicide monument, however, they would have additionally recognized that they had failed to act precisely where they ought to have, in front of the statue itself.
67 Thus while I accept Teegarden's broader interpretation of the oligarchs' actions, I would add that their manipulation of the statue worked to their advantage because of the potential costs involved as well: the oligarchs, in choosing as their object of defacement the very spot where citizens were expected to rally during an anti-democratic coup, made the Erythraeans' lack of commitment to democracy all the more obvious. Given the high cultural and political salience of the statue within Erythraean civic space-its status as a "focal point" of group action-the payoff to the oligarchs in successfully mistreating such an object was accordingly greater.
Here I use "salience" and "focal point" in the sense developed by the economist Thomas Schelling. He explained that large-scale group coordination can occur, even in the absence of prior planning, if prominent and important locations known to all serve as a meeting point. These places enjoy "salience" in the minds of disconnected individuals seeking to coordinate their behavior; the places themselves become "focal points" for joint action (1960, (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) . It is easiest to conceptualize focal points as locations of seemingly "spontaneous" assembly: people "just know" to meet at certain places when the moment demands. Of course, salience 68 Governments can also obliterate sites precisely so that they do not serve as focal points; Germany, for example, refuses to erect a plaque to mark the site of Hitler's bunker in Berlin, in part because it does not want neo-fascist groups using the site as a pilgrimage destination and a rallying point. 69 7.1.45 ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ. A similar intention was at work in Timoleon's demolition of the tyrant Dionysius' citadel and his construction of a democratic law court on the spot (Plut. Tim. 22.1-2) . 70 The specification that the tomb was of Heropythus "the liberator of the city" suggests, but does not guarantee, that the tomb featured an image of Heropythus in a heroic pose. 71 If they were cult buildings for Hagnon's honoring as a hero, they would have brought together large numbers of people in a manner that might have associated the cult with the democratic constitution in citizens' minds.
is not exogenous and unchanging: through conscious action, people can imbue places with salience where previously there was none. 68 Thus the Athenian tyrannicide monument seems to have enjoyed salience as a pro-democratic rallying point; as I am arguing here, the Philites statue did as well. By the same token, it is quite likely that the members of the Sicyonian demos, in burying their "benefactor" Euphron in the agora with heroic honors, were attempting to create a democratic "focal point" there (Xen. Hell. 7.3.12, cited above; ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ). After all, every time they came together in the agora to worship Euphron as founder, they would have symbolically recreated the foundational moment of their democracy, when Euphron first called them together "in the agora" with the promise of a new constitution. 69 Euphron's grave thus served, like the Athenian and Erythraean monuments, as a practical guide to preserving the democracy, but without actually making those guidelines explicit through the pose of a statue. The grave (taphos) of Heropythus at Ephesus may have functioned similarly: certainly, it was located in the central space of the agora and symbolized the Ephesian democracy; more speculatively, it may have been intended to encourage pro-democratic collective action.
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The oligarchs' attack on it would thus have been intended to accomplish similar goals to the Erythraean oligarchs' alteration of the Philites statue-fear, intimidation, and common knowledge that the demos had failed to rally around a highly salient focal point of democratic defense. In the Amphipolitan case, we cannot know the degree of salience enjoyed by the Hagnonian buildings: were they focal points for the pre-Brasidan, Athenian-founded democracy?
71 It is easy to imagine that as they were being torn down, partisans of the old democratic order felt a twinge of shame for failing to defend them.
It was not enough, however, for oligarchs simply to destroy the old sources of democratic power. They now had to replace them with new 73 1321a35-40: ἁρμόττει δὲ θυσίας τε εἰσιόντας ποιεῖσθαι μεγαλοπρεπεῖς καὶ κατασκευάζειν τι τῶν κοινῶν, ἵνα τῶν περὶ τὰς ἑστιάσεις μετέχων ὁ δῆμος καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὁρῶν κοσμουμένην τὰ μὲν ἀναθήμασι τὰ δὲ οἰκοδομήμασιν ἄσμενος ὁρᾷ μένουσαν τὴν πολιτείαν· συμβήσεται δὲ καὶ τοῖς γνωρίμοις εἶναι μνημεῖα τῆς δαπάνης.
processes of commemoration that would help to reinforce their own, considerably less popular, rule. It may at first appear puzzling that oligarchs would bother to carry out public rituals at all-were these kinds of mass gatherings not inherently dangerous to oligarchic regimes, as the author of the Rhetoric to Alexander explained? They were indeed, as several examples from the Classical period attest. We know of several democratic revolutions carried out in the agora or surrounding environs by large-scale uprisings of common citizens. Oligarchies in Mende, Rhodes, Corinth, Tegea, and-as we have seen-Sicyon were overthrown in this manner. 72 But it was precisely the inherent riskiness of bringing the people together that made the successful (i.e., controlled, orderly) execution of a public event useful for oligarchs. If the demos did not take the opportunity to revolt, they would be left with uncertainty and doubt: Did the populace actually oppose the regime? Did a democratic movement sufficient to bring down the oligarchy exist? Under this interpretation, oligarchic ritual events constitute opportunities for making the population's acquiescence to the status quo a matter of common knowledge. Their purpose was not primarily to convince participants of the ideological legitimacy of the regime (although this might be a welcome secondary effect), but to implicate the demos and to sow misinformation about the popularity of the oligarchy. Individuals faced with such information would then be much less likely to try to engage in anti-regime political activities. Continuing manipulation of monuments and rituals by oligarchies, above and beyond the initial destruction of democratic symbols analyzed above, was therefore about changing what was in people's heads rather than what was in their hearts. It was sufficient to sway people's strategic calculus on whether or not to resist the regime, without entering into considerations of ideology.
My conceptualization finds support in a remark of Aristotle in the Politics. In Book 6, Aristotle concerns himself with the different varieties of democracy and oligarchy and the different modes of organization that preserve each. In his discussion of oligarchies, he notes that: 73 74 Whibley 1896 and Ostwald 2000, the only existing English-language monographs on oligarchy, omit discussion of this passage entirely. De Ste. Croix 1981, 305-6 , cites the passage, commenting that it "seems to have escaped general notice," but ties it in more with Hellenistic acts of euergetism than with Classical oligarchy. Currie 2011, 293-94 with n.192 , uses this passage in a discussion of Pindar's Nemean 11 but misses the fact that Aristotle's comments apply only to oligarchies.
75 See further Veyne 1990, 92-93. Veyne, like de Ste. Croix, sees the passage as having "already a strongly Hellenistic flavor" (and cf. Domingo Gygax 2016, 248-49 ). Yet Aristotle says towards the end of the passage that oligarchs of his day are too greedy to perform these types of sacrifices (1321a40-42): he looks backwards rather than forwards.
It is appropriate for incoming magistrates to perform lavish sacrifices and to make improvements on objects of public property, so that the demos, by partaking of the elements of the feast and seeing the polis beautified in its dedications and buildings, is glad to see the regime persist; another result is that the members of the upper class will have memorials of their expenditure.
Scholars interested in Classical Greek oligarchy have largely neglected this passage, but it deserves closer attention. 74 Aristotle is not giving general advice about polis government but is instead advising oligarchs in particular to invest in such expenditures for the sake of political stability. The purpose of the oligarchs' investments is clearly to make the members of the demos accept a regime which they might normally oppose. The issue at stake is how precisely this acceptance is to be exacted from the people. It can best be characterized as a "carrot-and-stick" approach. In the first place, the demos "partakes" (metechein), not just of the feast itself, but of the "elements of the feast" (ta peri tas hestiaseis). By these we should understand the cultural practices that accompanied a sacrifice, including processions, musical and poetic productions (hymns, choruses, proso\ dia), and in general the festive atmosphere of the feast. The oligarchs' sacrifices thus represent an opportunity for granting the demos a much-longed-for taste of leisure and enjoyment: they are a sop. In this respect Aristotle's recommendation to oligarchs resembles an early (and Greek) form of panem et circenses.
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The second thing to note is the emphasis on the visual in Aristotle's description. As the members of the demos collectively partake of the elements of the feast, they also collectively "see" the results of the oligarchs' building projects. Once this happens, he says, the demos thereby happily (asmenos) "sees" (ὁρᾷ again) the constitution remaining in place. Aristotle's meaning seems to be that a tacit bargain has been achieved: the demos gets its food and urban beautification, in exchange for which 76 See Chwe 2001, 19-25 , and, for applications to the ancient world, Ober 2008, 190-210; Teegarden 2014, 37-40. 77 For evidence that the ancient Greeks were aware of this potential effect of public spectacles, see Xenophon's description (Cyr. 8.3.5) of an armed procession organized by Cyrus the Great of Persia: he planned it in such a way as to make it "as fine a spectacle as possible for his well-wishers, but most terrifying to the disaffected." 78 The existence of modern practices along these lines of course does not prove that that is what is at work in the ancient context, but the modern examples are suggestive. they agree not to try to overthrow the oligarchy. I would argue, however, that Aristotle's own language suggests that a more complex process is simultaneously at work. The collective subject of the visual verb-"the demos" sees-means that we are dealing not simply with visibility but with a panoptic situation: the individual common people each see themselves and their peers participating peacefully in the oligarchy, with the overall result that "common knowledge" of the demos' submission to the oligarchy is achieved. In a state of common knowledge, people not only all know something to be the case, they know that all others know it, that those others know the same thing about them, and so on. 76 In the present case, the demos' common knowledge of their submission to oligarchic rule, achieved in the context of the collective spectacle, serves to decrease each person's willingness to engage in pro-democratic political resistance.
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The long-term practical effect of such calculations, in the aggregate, is the ongoing stability and survival of the oligarchy, as the beginnings of resistance fail to materialize. Thus where Aristotle sees only a quid pro quo arrangement, it is possible to detect a dynamic process whereby the demos' collective implication in the oligarchs' sacrifices-and the common people's common knowledge of that implication, which they themselves "see"-leads to them continuing to "see" the oligarchy in power, whether they individually like it or not. This is the more coercive aspect of the arrangement, the "stick" in the "carrot-and-stick" approach.
If this is indeed the project Classical oligarchs were engaged in when they utilized commemorative events for political purposes, their actions find numerous parallels in the practices of modern authoritarian regimes. 78 Political scientists have amply documented the ways in which contemporary dictatorships induce their populations to participate in regime rituals, thus giving the people a stake in the government and spreading confusion about the government's popularity. To take just one example, that of the regime of Hafiz al-Assad in 1980s Syria, Wedeen has convincingly shown that the leader's cult of personality was not primarily about producing beliefs or engendering genuine commitments. Instead, 79 See Pfaff 2006, 72-80, on Leninist regimes in the late 1908s; Slater 2010, 14-20, on Southeast Asian authoritarian states. 80 The repeated references in the sources to the word mne\ meion, with its connotations of memory and memorial, point to another process at work in these scenarios, namely contestation over collective memory. Democrats and oligarchs of the Classical period were thus engaged-in a quite direct way-in the fashioning of what Hans-Joachim Gehrke has labeled "intentional history," or "the social knowledge of the past, in other words that which the state's power resided "in its ability to impose national fictions and to make people say and do what they otherwise would not." As Wedeen explains, the regime's power to make people act "as if" they believed in the cult of personality, even if it was widely understood that most people did not, made citizens complicit: "it entangled them in self-enforcing relations of domination, thereby making it hard for participants to see themselves simply as victims of the state's caprices" (1999, (83) (84) . Whenever a Syrian consented to participating in a "spontaneous" rally in support of Assad, or chanted a pro-regime slogan, or lent his or her talent (poetic, artistic, theatrical) to a public spectacle-all things regularly demanded by the regime-he or she reinforced this web of complicity. The same relations of domination have been identified in numerous other modern contexts.
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Returning to the passage of Aristotle, we can note how his language echoes that of the Brasidas episode in Thucydides and of the other sources studied here. Aristotle recommends "sacrifices" (thusiai) and the renovation of public property, in the form of "dedications" (anathe\ mata) and "buildings" (oikodome\ mata); the latter types of construction will serve as "memorials" (mne\ meia) of the ruling class. Similarly, the Amphipolitans instituted yearly sacrifices for Brasidas (ete\ sioi thusiai) and constructed a mne\ meion for him; in the meantime they cast down all of the "buildings" (oikodome\ mata) and erased all traces that were likely to serve as a "reminder" (mne\ mosunon) of their old founder Hagnon. As has already been observed, the erasures of Hagnon's name were likely to occur on dedications set up by him, just as the Ilion anti-tyranny decree commanded that names be cut out of anathe\ mata and even tombs. In a further terminological echo, the Ilion decree's fundamental purpose is to ensure that every last "memorial" (mne\ meion) of the tyrant/oligarchs be eliminated. The close similarities in language constitute further evidence, I would argue, that the political considerations outlined in the Aristotle passage were at work in the Brasidas episode: the Amphipolitan oligarchs sought to project their power and implicate the demos by erecting their own distinctive political mne\ meia and involving the common people in the newly instituted rites of the Brasidas cult. 80 The hero shrine represented a society knows and holds for true about its past" (2001, 286) . On the collective political memory of the polis, a topic that is beginning to receive greater attention, see Ma 2009; Schepens 2001; Shear 2011, 286-312; Steinbock 2013 ; Simonton forthcoming. The issue is alive and well in the United States in 2017, when controversy has erupted over the continued display of commemorative monuments to Confederate generals (see, e.g., Eric Foner, "Confederate statues and 'our ' history," New York Times, August 20, 2017) . 81 Some democratic Samians were in exile after the oligarchs' takeover (Xen. Hell. 2.3.6-7; IG II 2 1), but many would have remained in the territory: cf. Shipley 1987, 132-33. 82 This is what the political scientist David Laitin calls "the second face of culture"-"in which shared symbols are used for instrumental ends" (1988, 591 ). Laitin's own research shows how elites in the cultural region of Yorubaland in Africa "exploited the powerful and available symbols of ancestral city identification to organize political action seeking to enhance their group's wealth and power." both a break with the democratic past (in the form of Hagnon's cult and buildings) and an ongoing bulwark of oligarchic power, as the Amphipolitan demos was induced, by both the "carrot" of the festival atmosphere and the "stick" of the collective spectacle of domination, to tolerate the new oligarchic reality. There can be little doubt that similar conditions obtained at Samos later in the century. Those members of the demos still present at Samos after the oligarchic takeover of 404 would have been compromised by their participation in the Lysandreia, when sacrifices and songs performed in honor of Lysander would have both bought their loyalty and intimidated them into submission.
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The burial and heroization of Brasidas at Amphipolis is thus part of-in fact it inaugurates-a series of battles between democrats and oligarchs over the commemorative landscape of the Classical polis. Moreover, as I have attempted to show, these battles were not conflicts over mere "symbols," devoid of practical import. Rather, the ability to manipulate, destroy, and replace objects of ritual and political importance sent meaningful signals to one's opponents, signals which affected their assessment of the political situation, their trust in their fellow citizens, and thus their inclination to act in resistance. In emphasizing the instrumental, strategic considerations at play in commemoration, the argument appears in danger of becoming overly reductive, of ignoring the cultural beliefs and convictions-the subjective, ideological side-that undoubtedly factored into ritual practice. But the instrumental use of culture presupposes the existence of a broadly shared system of meaningful words, images, and actions. It was the pre-existing importance of commemorative processeshero cult, statues, graves, memorials-to the polis that made them a point of contestation between oligarchs and democrats. 82 Moreover, not every act of commemoration was an overtly political one along the lines I have 83 The present article grew out of my 2012 dissertation, a revised version of which has now appeared as Simonton 2017. Early drafts were presented at Stanford University and at the 2013 meeting of the American Philological Association; I thank audience members at both events for their useful feedback. Eric Driscoll, Al Duncan, James Kierstead, and Dan-El Padilla Peralta contributed excellent comments and criticisms at various stages of drafting.
suggested: many hundreds of nonpartisan acts must have taken place across the poleis of the Classical Greek world on a daily basis. We should not for this reason, however, ignore politically significant manipulations of commemoration where they do occur. In overlooking them, we miss a subtle but powerful means by which regimes maintained themselves in power, one recognized already by Aristotle and used, in 
